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COMMENTS ON "COMMISSIONS AND PUBLIC LAND
POLICIES: SETTING THE STAGE FOR CHANGE"
By DENNIS A. RAPP*
"The Public Land Law Review Commission was not the
President's idea in the first place."' This observation by Mr. Hag-
enstein distinguishes the political origins of the Public Land Law
Review Commission (PLLRC) from most of the other types of
commissions he explores in his survey of commissions as the tools
of presidential politics. Because it was a congressional idea, the
success or failure of the PLLRC cannot properly be judged by the
motives behind a presidential initiative to create commissions for
various purposes.
The absence of strong presidential interest in a comprehen-
sive study of public land policy in 1964 was not surprising. There
was no major political issue of national importance concerning
the public lands which demanded presidential leadership in its
resolution. Other problems commanded White House attention.
The Viet Nam war had escalated, and a new set of social prob-
lems was being launched under the Great Society banner. The
most recent event concerning the public lands that had attracted
national attention was the enactment of the Wilderness Act of
1964:2 the latest step in the continuing erosion of economic inter-
ests' access to public land resources. The Wilderness Act particu-
larly threatened timber and mining interests in public lands.
Neither the President then in the White House nor the agen-
cies of the executive branch responsible for the administration of
the public lands were especially enthusiastic about the prospects
of joining in a thoroughgoing review of public land policy by a
congressionally-dominated Commission, among whose an-
nounced goals was redress of Congress' weak legal and political
power over public lands decisions involving assignments of the
use of the land and its resources. Much the same attitudes and
priorities existed at the White House and in the land manage-
ment agencies when the Commission reported in the summer of
* Managing Director of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
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16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1964).
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1970. Viet Nam was the major international and domestic politi-
cal issue that summer. No one downtown really wanted to start
a major legislative effort to rewrite public land policy based on
the Commission's report, especially when, as the Commission's
studies made clear, the executive branch was holding all the
cards to administer the public lands its own way-well, almost
all the cards.
The Department of the Interior wanted a statutory pro-
nouncement that would have made clear that the remaining
public domain holdings were to be retained and managed, and
further, wanted to remove the uncertainties of the applicability
of disposal policies of the nineteenth and the early twentieth
centuries still on the statute books. The Forest Service needed
little, in its opinion, to augment the broadly written statutory
powers it already possessed than gave it virtually limitless dis-
cretion in the way it chose to withhold or distribute the resources
of the National Forests. Both agencies wanted an end to the
disengaging and disruptive effect of the self-operating Mining
Law' on land management programs under agency administra-
tion. No one in the executive branch wanted any basic redirection
of the national parks and federal wildlife refuge-game range sys-
tems.
But none of these issues were important enough to convince
the White House and the land managing agencies that they had
to create a commission to come to terms with Congress on their
resolution. Actually, the President's signature on the statute cre-
ating the Public Land Law Review Commission was the fulfill-
ment of a political commitment made by President Kennedy in
exchange for delivery by Congress, or more specifically by the
Chairman of the House Interior Committee, of the Wilderness
Act of 1964. That was all there was to it as far as the White House
was concerned.
If presidential commissions were created to lend blue ribbon
prestige (and therefore acceptability) to the resolution of public
policy issues too hot or too complicated for a President to sponsor
from within the normal institutions of the executive branch, the
Public Land Law Review Commission was created to assure, in
the minds of some members of Congress, congressional domina-
3 30 U.S.C. §§ 621-625 (1955).
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tion of its recommendations, with the intention of co-opting the
President by association with the Commission's presidential ap-
pointees.
Western regional and interest-group political power asso-
ciated with purely economic interest in and control over the pub-
lic lands has been waning for 100 years. It represents a regional-
ism destined to come out second best in Washington, where fed-
eral policymaking has and will probably always favor the conser-
vation and public use interests in the public lands-recreation,
preservation, and the resources for "all the people"-an interest
inherently identified as "national" in the minds of both the exec-
utive and the nonpartisan majority in Congress.
The Public Land Law Review Commission was a last at-
tempt, at least in the minds of both its congressional architects
and some of their sympathizers downtown, to reestablish some
type of equilibrium. It failed in this purpose.
If Congress wanted to recapture power in public land deci-
sionmaking, the time and money may have been better spent on
a singular congressional effort aimed at producing well-written
legislation to return to Congress a portion of the discretionary
power for public land policymaking handed to the executive
branch for decades by the very same Congress that now wanted
it back. As Mr. Hagenstein points out, the Senate Select Com-
mittee on National Water Resources was a congressional commis-
sion only4 and achieved a significant measure of success, indi-
cated by the number of its recommendations and policy precepts
that became federal water policy. Even if the PLLRC effort had
been confined to the east end of Pennsylvania Avenue, any
chance that recapture legislation, even if it succeeded in getting
through both Houses of Congress, would escape a veto at the
other end of town was slim. No contemporary President-neither
a Great Society Democrat nor a Law and Order Republican-is
interested in relinquishing executive power.
So much for one test of the PLLRC's success. If one uses only
the test of its architects' initial motives and their actions that
have ensued in the nearly seven years since it filed its report, then
PLLRC was a complete failure, except perhaps to illustrate to
Hagenstein, supra note 1.
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Congress the futility of attempting to capture the Executive by
way of a joint commission.
There is another test, however, of the success of PLLRC.
That is the obvious test of the efficacy of its product-its report
and its recommendations for change in public lands policies. Did
the Commission, in its recommendations, really offer a sound
blueprint for modernization of the policies and programs that
should control the disposal, management, and administration of
the public lands in the decades ahead? Will the public lands
resources best serve the needs of both the nation as a whole and
the regions in which they lie if they are managed and adminis-
tered and their resources used under the principles espoused by
the Commission? If the answers are yes, then why haven't the
Commission's proposals been written into law-nearly seven
years after it issued its report?
Mr. Hagenstein suggests some of the answers to the last
question: no organized program for a follow-through after the
report was issued, and the rapid loss of elected offices of the
Congressional Commission members, including Chairman Aspin-
all, within a few years after the Commission's work was com-
pleted. But within the last two years, a number of the Commis-
sion's recommendations on controversial issues have been en-
acted into law. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 19761 embraced the spirit and much of the substance of the
Commission's report in establishing the policy foundations for a
retention and management program for the residual unreserved
public domain. The 1976 Act also resolved the tenure uncertain-
ties that have prevailed during more than forty years since enact-
ment of the Taylor Grazing Act.'
The settlement laws have been repealed. Congress has made
provision for moving toward the kind of withdrawal review pro-
gram recommended by the Commission. A program for compre-
hensive public land planning, including a requirement for
federal-state planning coordination, has been enacted into law.
Congress took a step in the direction of modernizing the public
land lien tax payment policies along the lines recommended by
the Commission. Mining in the national parks has been prohib-
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (1976).
6 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 485, 1171 (1934).
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ited by law, again as the Commission recommended. Although no
action has been taken by Congress to change the Mining Law,' it
should be remembered that the Commission was not unanimous
in its conclusions for needed reform of this controversial law. Not
all of the above-mentioned enactments have adopted the Com-
mission's recommendations in precisely the form suggested by
the Commission, but the principles of the Commission's propos-
als have been substantially adopted by these new statutes.
While these moves to modify public land policy followed a
release of the Commission's report by more than five years, there
is no doubt that the Commission's work and proposals have had
a major influence on their shape and substance. Thus the blue-
print is becoming structure; its enactment is proof of its political
acceptability; and the changes in policy that they constitute are
unquestionably improvements more suited to the needs of today's
culture than the policy structure displaced.
Most of the policy and program changes enacted into law
extend the erosion of congressional power, strengthen the hand of
the executive and the management agencies, and weaken the
opportunities for exclusive economic capture of public lands re-
sources. While most of the congressional members of the Com-
mission supported the adoption of these policy recommendations
by the Commission, only two members were still in Congress
when the policies were enacted into law. One wonders whether
this much progress would have been realized if all the original
congressional members of the Commission were still members of
Congress and members of the Interior Committees.
Only time will tell how much more of the Commission's blue-
print will be adopted as policy structure for the public lands. The
pattern of delay and then recent gradual adoption of some of its
proposals may lead one to observe, first, that the motives of the
Commission's architects and the principal features of its final
product did not converge; second, that although the Commis-
sion's report does offer a politically acceptable blueprint for the
modernization of public land policy, it had little chance for enact-
ment so long as key congressional members of the Commission
remained in power in Congress after the Commission's report was
' 30 U.S.C. §§ 621-625 (1955).
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completed and released; and third, that service by members of
Congress on joint congressional-presidential commissions brings
out the best of their statesmanship in perceiving and adopting the
shape of policies that serve all of society best.
